

Designing Evolutionary Treatment for Metastatic Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer

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CATMo 2020



Outline

- 1 Cancer Treatment as a Stackelberg Evolutionary Game (SEG)
- 2 SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer with Immune Checkpoint Inhibition
 - Data
 - Questions
 - Approach to Address One of These Questions
 - Interesting Observations
 - Results
- 3 Conclusions & Future Research
- 4 Discussion Points

1. Cancer Treatment as a Stackelberg Evolutionary Game

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|------------|---------------------------|--|
| players | physician (leader) | patients' cancer cells (followers) |
| strategies | therapy options | effective strategies of therapy resistance |
| objectives | patients' quality of life | fitness |

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- 1 (rationality) Only the physician is rational and he/she can anticipate future events. In contrast, cancer cells, typical of evolving organisms in nature, can only respond to what is happening or has happened

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Salvioli, PhD thesis 2020; Salvioli et al, PLOS One, in press; Cunningham et al, JTB 2018, PLOS One 2020, Stankova et al, JAMA Onc 2019...

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What is the minimal knowledge necessary?




2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC)




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Data on NSCLC treated with Immune Checkpoint Inhibition:



- Stage 4, anti-PD1 drug Atezolizumab (MPDL3280A)
- Tumor diameter over time, typically few time points
- In our dataset typically 2 or 3 metastases per patient



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Our modelling approach to answer question 2:

Fitting the data into minimalistic G-function model

Optimizing the treatment for cases with tumor growing

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Example of data :

All patients treated with the same immune checkpoint inhibition

Treatment starts between the first and second data points

Are these different trends a result of treatment-induced resistance and other patient- and tumor-specific factors?

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

NSCLC model details (Vincent and Brown (2005)):

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = x \left(G^m; u; x \right) - \frac{u}{K} x^2 - d x$$

| symbol & range | meaning |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|
| $u > 0; 1$ | treatment (on or off) |
| $u > 0; 1$ | rate of treatment-induced resistance |
| $K > 0$ | carrying capacity |
| $x > 0; K$ | cancer cell population |
| $G^m; u; x$ | fitness-generating function |
| $r_{max} > 0$ | maximal growth rate |
| $d > 0$ | natural death rate |
| $C > 0$ | evolutionary speed |
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Three different forms of r^u considered:

Quadratic cost of resistance: $r^u = r_{\max} (1 - u^2)$

Linear cost of resistance: $r^u = r_{\max} (1 - u)$

No cost of resistance: $r^u = r_{\max}$

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Fitting the model (also for predictions) :

The population of cancer cells is estimated from the diameter.

Distinguishing 6 groups of tumors: 3 according to initial volume and 2 according to initial trend.

Fix K , b and d per group, estimate r_{\max} , k and u^0 per patient, d fixed to 0.01.

| | Small | Medium | Large |
|------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Increasing | $K = 0.1$ | $K = 2$ | $K = 2$ |
| | $b = 100$ 0.01 | $b = 150$ 0.01 | $b = 0.9$ 0.05 |
| Decreasing | $K = 1000$ | $K = 0.5$ | $K = 1000$ |
| | $b = 5$ 0.05 | $b = 2$ 0.01 | $b = 10$ 0.01 |

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underline{x} &= x G^m; u; x \\
 \underline{u} &= \frac{G^m; u; x}{u} \\
 G^m; u; x &= r^u \ll 1 \quad \frac{x}{K} \cdot \frac{m}{k - bu} \quad d
 \end{aligned}$$

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$$\frac{dx}{dt} = x G^m; u; x \bullet - \frac{r u \bullet x}{K} - \frac{m}{k b u} d$$

Jakob Nikolas Kather: "There is no cost of resistance or carrying capacity in cancers I am dealing with"

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Fitting the model :

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Comparison with linear and exponential models :

Mean of the R2-scores: 0:59, 0:72, 0:80 for linear, exponential and evolutionary models, respectively.

Linear, exponential and evolutionary model with quadratic cost of resistance

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Evolution of treatment-induced resistance only plays an important role in tumors that exhibit a rapid change of trend.

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2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Comparison of the different forms of r^u :

Quadratic and linear cost of resistance

No cost of resistance

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC Optimization

$$m^* = \arg \min_{m^* \in [0,1]} x^* T$$

$$x^* = G(m^*; u^*; x^*)$$

$$u^* = \frac{\partial G(m^*; u^*; x^*)}{\partial u^*}$$

$$G(m^*; u^*; x^*) = r \cdot u^* \cdot \left(\frac{x^*}{K} + \frac{m^*}{k \cdot b \cdot u^*} \right)^d; \quad t > 0; T$$

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$$m^* = \arg \min_{m^* \in [0,1]} x^T$$

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$$G^* m^*; u^*; x^{**} = r^* u^{**} \ominus \frac{x^*}{K}, \quad \frac{m^*}{k - b u^*} d; \quad t > 0; T$$

Preliminary results:

With linear and/or quadratic cost of resistance, the best is to always treat or not treat at all

With no cost of resistance, sometimes it is the best to switch between no and standard treatment. We do not understand yet when precisely.

With the objective $\min x^T$, we can never stop the growth, we can only slow it down

2. SEG Application to Treatment of Metastatic NSCLC

Optimization - preliminary results :

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- For tumors that change diameter rapidly, evolution of treatment-induced resistance plays a role
- For small tumors the error in estimating tumor volume may cause issues with the best fit; it may be that our conclusion would change with better tumor proxy
- Our model has better predictive capabilities than linear/exponential models used until now

4. Discussion Points/Questions for You

- Does resistance to immune checkpoint inhibition in NSCLC carry a cost?
- If yes, is there any way how to estimate it from other measurements (For other projects/cancers, we are exploring whether genomics and histopathology can help us to answer such questions, but here we know too little)?
- What other information can be useful here?
- Would a model with immune cells as active players be a better choice here?

Thank you !

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